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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright and patent law has developed a very large loophole.
Every entity in the United States, including the federal government,
can be sued for damages if they violate the federal copyright and
patent laws-with the sole exception of the states. The states have
been held to be immune from such suits under the eleventh amend-
ment of the Constitution.
As the law presently stands, copyright owners are unable to sue
state governmental bodies for damages for infringing their copy-
rights.' In Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,2 the most recent U.S,
Circuit Court of Appeals case dealing with copyright infringement
by a state, the court concluded that "[a state] cannot be sued for
infringement damages in federal court-or anywhere, for that mat-
ter." 3 The court in Lane went on to say that "the States-pending
some future action by the Congress-continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity in regard to damage suits charging copyright infringe-
ment. "4
This is a very unfair situation. A report by the U.S. Copyright
Office entitled "Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh
Amendment" evidences that if States are not held responsible under
the federal copyright laws (as all other users are), the potential exists
for immediate harm to copyright owners in the form of widespread
copying. This illegal copying could result in increased prices for the
infringed works and diminished creativity on the part of authors.5
1. See Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989); BV Eng'g v. Univeristy of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir.
1989).
2. 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989).
3. Id. at 174.
4. Id. at 176.
5. In March, 1989, Congress took steps to amend the Copyright Act of 1976 by proposing
the "Copyright Remedy Clarification Act." S. 497, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1131, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1989). This proposed bill would amend section 50(a) and section 910(a) of Title 17
of the United States Code by explicitly including States within the term "anyone" in defining who
could be liable for copyright infringement. Senator DeConcini introduced this bill with the following
[Vol. 92
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It also appears that patent owners are equally unable to sue a
state for damages for infringing their patents. In Chew v. Cali-
fornia,6 an apparent case of first impression, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit held that states are immune from suit for
patent infringement.
7
This paper will discuss how such a large loophole in the law
developed and the effect that the Supreme Court's recent decisions
will have on possible solutions. This discussion must necessarily be-
gin with Hans v, Louisiana,' a Supreme Court case decided almost
one hundred years ago. Hans was the first Supreme Court decision
to extend the scope of state eleventh amendment immunity beyond
the specific limits stated in the text of the eleventh amendment. To
prevent severe injustices which resulted from the broad sweep of
state eleventh amendment immunity, the Supreme Court then rec-
ognized several exceptions to the general rule of state immunity: (1)
express waiver; (2) injunctive relief; (3) implied waiver; and (4) direct
abrogation.
statements.
I rise today to introduce a bill with my colleagues Senator Simon and Senator Hatch to
reaffirm Congress' intent that States be subject to suit under the 1976 Copyright Act for
copyright infringement. This bill has been made necessary by recent Federal Circuit Court
opinions which, contrary to what I believe was the clear intent of Congress when enacting
the Copyright Act of 1976, have held that States are immune from suit in Federal court
for infringement of copyright material. If these decisions are allowed to stand, without
further congressional action, the intolerable result will be that States are entirely immune
from prosecution for infringement under the comprehensive scheme of copyright protection
the Congress provided in the Copyright Act. This lack of protection for American copy-
righted material cannot be allowed to continue, and Congress must act now to restore to
the law the degree of protection that has been thought to exist since Congress originally
enacted the copyright law. The act must be amended to make clear that States are subject
to suit in Federal district court for claims of copyright infringement.
135 CONG. REc. § 2012 (daily ed. March 2, 1989) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Then in July, 1989, Congress decided that it needed to make itself even more clear, so it renamed
the bill the "State Copyright Liability Legislation" bill and added an explicit reference to state im-
munity under the eleventh amendment. "Any State .. .shall not be immune, under the eleventh
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, from suit in Federal court ... for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner." S. 497, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1131, 101st, 1st Sess. (1989).
6. Chew v. California, No. S-88-245 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 1988), reprinted in 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1159, aff'd, No. 89-1390 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 1990) (VESTLAW, 1990 WL 108).
7. Id. at 12.
8. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 US. 1 (1890).
1990]
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In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,9 and its progeny, the Su-
preme Court changed the rules for interpreting congressional intent
in cases involving state immunity from suit under the eleventh
amendment. Atascadero disallowed the normal inquiry by courts
into legislative history and policy considerations. The U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal which have ruled on the issue of state amenability
to suit for copyright infringement (post-Atascadero) have all found
the states to be immune from suit because the text of the Copyright
Act of 197610 does not state "with unmistakable clarity" that Con-
gress intended to abrogate state immunity either directly or through
the states' implied waiver of their eleventh amendment immunity.
However, Congress is in the process of amending the Copyright Act
of 1976 to make their intention "unmistakably clear" in order to
remedy what Congress considers to be a misinterpretation on the
part of the courts."
However, Congress' revision of the Copyright Act may be of no
avail if the Supreme Court decides that Congress doesn't have the
power to abrogate state immunity when legislating pursuant to its
powers under the Constitution's article I Patent and Copyright
Clause. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Un-
ion Gas Co.'2 held that Congress had the power to abrogate state
immunity when legislating pursuant to the Constitution's article I
Commerce Clause. Most unfortunately, the court's rationale easily
extends to Congress' other article I plenary powers, including the
patent and copyright powers. If the federal courts are unwilling to
extend the Supreme Court's holding in Union Gas Co. to the patent
and copyright plenary power, Congress can apparently still use the
implied waiver doctrine from Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks
Dep't.13 to try to ensure that states will be amenable to suit. The
implied waiver doctrine allows Congress to condition a state's par-
ticipation in a federal program on the state's waiver of its eleventh
amendment immunity, provided that Congress makes its intention
9. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
11. See supra note 4.
12. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
13. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
[Vol. 92
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to create such a condition unmistakably clear in the text of the
statute.
II. LEGAL HISTORY
The Supreme Court is split as to the correct interpretation of
the eleventh amendment.' 4 One view holds that the eleventh amend-
ment gives the state immunity from suit because of the vital role
played by sovereign immunity in our federal system. 5 The other view
holds that such immunity should be narrowly construed because it
can be easily abused by the state to obstruct our federal system.
16
The dispute centers on the precedent established by the Supreme
Court almost 100 years ago in Hans v. Louisiana17 and the numerous
cases that have followed that decision.' 8 Four justices have expressed
their strong conviction that Hans should be overruled; 19 however,
14. The eleventh amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that "[t]he judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XI.
Four Justices (Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens) have consistently dissented in recent
eleventh amendment cases in which a majority of the Court has found a State to be immune from
suit. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 247; Welch v. Texas State Dep't of Highways
and Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958 (1987); Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989);
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989); and Hoffman v. Connecticut
Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824 (1989).
15. "Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), firmly established that the eleventh amendment
embodies a broad constitutional principal of sovereign immunity." Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2952.
"Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated
stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system."
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
16.
The doctrine [of sovereign immunity] that has thus been created is pernicious .... [Tihe
current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting the states from
the consequences of their illegal conduct. And the decision obstructs the sound operation
of our federal system by limiting the ability of Congress to take steps it deems necessary
and proper to achieve national goals within its constitutional authority.
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1980).
18. For detailed analysis of the history and development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the eleventh amendment, see Recent Development, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh
Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 VAND. L. REv. 225 (1987); Comment, The Applicability
of Eleventh Amendment Immunity Under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 36 Ai. U. L. REv.
163 (1986). See also, Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 247-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. "[I]f Hans was a constitutional holding, it rested on misconceived history and misguided
logic." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301-02 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1990]
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a majority has been unwilling to directly overrule it.2°
In Hans v. Louisiana,21 the Supreme Court recognized a non-
textual interpretation of the eleventh amendment which greatly
broadened the scope of state immunity. Hans held that the principle
of sovereign immunity reflected in the eleventh amendment rendered
the states immune from suits for monetary damages in federal court
even when jurisdiction was premised on the presence of a federal
question rather than on diversity. 22 Thus, the eleventh amendment
"Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) can properly be characterized an 'egregiously incorrect."'
Atascadero State Hasp., 437 U.S, at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
Hans has proven to be unsound. The doctrine has been unstable, because it lacks a textual
anchor, an established historical foundation, or a rationale. We should not forget that the
irrationality of the doctrine has its costs. It has led to the development of a complex set
of rules to avoid unfair results .... [I]t is a time to begin a fresh examination of eleventh
amendment jurisdiction without the weight of that mistaken precedent.
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2969-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Relying to a large extent on the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court in Welch chose not to
overrule Hans.
Today, for the fourth time in little more than two years, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), four members of the Court urge that we overrule Hans v. Louis-
iana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and the long line of cases that has followed it,
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2948.
Again, in Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989), the court chose not to overrule Hans. "We
decline this most recent invitation to overrule our opinion in Hans." Id. at 2401 n.2.
21. Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sued the state of Louisiana in federal court alleging that the
State's failure to pay interest on certain bonds violated the Contract clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890). In Hans, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amend-
ment could be extended to bar suit brought against a state by its own citizens. Id. at 10-13, 20-21.
22. "In Hans v. Louisiana, this Court held that the principle of sovereign immunity reflected
in the eleventh amendment rendered the States immune from suits for monetary damages in federal
court even where jurisdiction was premised on the presence of a federal question." Pennsylvania,
109 S. Ct. at 2277 (citation omitted) (stating the holding of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
But in his dissent in Welch, Justice Brennan explained why he believed that Hans was incorrectly
decided and why the eleventh amendment was intended to protect States only from federal suits
premised on diversity, and not on federal suits premised on a federal question.
Since Congress had not granted federal question jurisdiction to federal courts prior to the
[eleventh] amendment's ratification, the amendment was not intended to restrict that type
of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the controversy among the Ratifiers cited by the Court today,
ante, at 2963-64, involved only diversity suits, Moreover, the Court recognizes that the
immediate impetus for adoption of the eleventh amendment was Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793). Ante, at 2965. Chisholm was a diversity case brought in
federal court upon a state cause of action against the State of Georgia by a citizen of South
Carolina ....
Hans, however, was a federal question suit brought by a Louisiana citizen against his
own State. Ignoring this fact, the Court in Hans relied on materials that primarily addressed
6
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was interpreted as barring a citizen from bringing a suit against his
own state in federal court, "even though the express terms of the
[eleventh] amendment do not so provide." 23 Because of the injustices
that would result if states were never held accountable in federal
courts, the Supreme Court realized that it was necessary to allow
exceptions to the broad eleventh amendment sovereign immunity of
the states. 24 As a result, the Court carved out four exceptions to the
general rule of state sovereign immunity: (1) express waiver; 25 (2)
injunctive relief; (3) implied waiver; 26 and (4) direct abrogation.
The first exception was already in place before the Hans decision.
The Supreme Court had previously held that a state could "ex-
pressly" waive its eleventh amendment immunity and "expressly"
consent to suit in federal court.27 The second exception was an-
nounced in Ex parte Young. 28 The Court in Ex Parte Young held
that the eleventh amendment did not bar a citizen from bringing a
the question of state sovereign immunity in diversity cases, and not on federal question
... cases. It is plain from the face of the Hans opinion that the Court misunderstood
those materials. In particular, the Court in Hans heavily relied on two sources: a statement
by Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 81 and the views of Justice Iredell, who wrote the
dissent in Chisholm. 134 U.S., at 12, 13-14, 18-19, 10 S. Ct. at 506, 506-07, 508-09. A
close examination of both these sources indicates that they cannot serve as support for the
holding of Hans or of the Court today.
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2965 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original).
23. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238 (discussing the holding of Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890)).
24. It is important to note the difference between eleventh amendment state sovereign immunity
and common-law sovereign immunity. A federal district court recently described the distinction: "the
eleventh amendment represents a restraint upon the federal judicial power to hear suits against an
unconsenting state, whereas the doctrine of sovereign immunity goes to the question of whether the
sovereign may be sued at all." United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 910 (D.N.H. 1985) (citation
omitted).
25. See generally Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REv.
513 (1983).
26. See generally Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974
DUKE LJ. 925 (1974).
27, See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that a state may effectuate
an express waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity).
28. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex Parte Young was a suit for injunctive relief
against the Attorney General of Minnesota. In Ex Parte Young, the plaintiff sought to prevent the
enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute that involved state railroad rate and tariff
restrictions that were allegedly confiscatory and, therefore, in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 126-34.
1990]
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suit for injunctive relief against a state official whose conduct vi-
olated the U.S. Constitution.29
A third exception was created in Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala.
Docks Dep't3 0 In Parden, the Court held that if the state chose to
participate in a federal program, the state could be found to have
"impliedly" waived its eleventh amendment immunity and "im-
pliedly" consented to damage suits in federal court." The Parden
Court stated that "when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively
its own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation,
it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private
person or corporation.
'3 2
In later decisions the Court limited the implied waiver doctrine
it had created in Parden by requiring that two conditions be met
before the Court would find that a state had impliedly waived its
immunity. The first condition was that a federal statute must create
an express federal cause of action. 33 The second condition was that
a federal statute must state, in unmistakably clear language, Con-
gress' intention to condition state participation in a federal program
on a waiver of the states' eleventh amendment immunity.34
A fourth exception was created in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer3 5 The
Court in Fitzpatrick held that Congress could directly abrogate the
29. The court adopted a legal fiction that a state official who acts pursuant to an unconsti-
tutional state statute is "stripped of his official or representative character" and thus is not protected
by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 159-60.
30. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
31. In Parden, employees of a state railroad sued the state of Alabama for damages in federal
court under Congress' Federal Employers' Liability Act. Id. at 184-88. The Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act enabled employees to sue their employers for job-related personal injuries. 45 U.S.C. §§
51-60 (1962).
32. Parden, 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
33. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673-78 (1974) (holding that Congress must have
created an express federal cause of action under a federal program before a state can be found to
have impliedly waived its eleventh amendment immunity).
34. See Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health and welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280, 286-87
(1973) (holding that there must be clear evidence of Congressional intent before it could be held that
Congress had conditioned state participation in a federal program on States' waiving their eleventh
amendment immunity).
See also Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2948 (expressly overruling the part of the Parden decision that
"is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of the eleventh amendment immunity by
Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language").
35. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, Connecticut state employees sued the state in federal court for
[Vol. 92
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states' eleventh amendment immunity without the states' consent
when Congress was acting pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 6 In Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court no longer required
that an "implied waiver" be found before a citizen could sue a state
for damages in federal court. This was the first recognition by the
Court that Congress could directly abrogate state immunity inde-
pendent of any consent, either express or implied, on the part of
the states.
Because many copyright and patent infringement cases against
a state seek money damages and rarely involve any express waiver
of immunity by the state, the federal courts must usually focus on
the applicability of the third exception (implied waiver) and the fourth
exception (direct abrogation). Thus, in copyright and patent in-
fringement cases against a state, federal courts are presented with
the choice of applying the general rule of state immunity or of find-
ing an implied waiver or a direct abrogation by Congress which
would allow a state to be sued in federal court.
After Fitzpatrick, a split developed among the federal circuits as
to whether states were immune from liability under the federal copy-
right laws. The Eighth Circuit held in Wihtol v. Crow3 7 that the
state was immune from suit under its eleventh amendment immu-
nity. 8 However, in Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit,
citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, held that the Patent and Copyright Clause
gave Congress the power to abrogate the States' eleventh amendment
immunity. 9 Several other federal courts also expressed their con-
sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 448 (1976).
36. Id. at 456.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment states that "[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
37. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
38. Note that the Wihtol decision was rendered prior to both Parden and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
and thus was rendered before the Supreme Court had sanctioned either the implied waiver doctrine
or the direct abrogation doctrine. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Parden v. Terminal
Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
39. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1979).
1990]
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flicting opinions,4" A similar split had also developed between federal
district courts as to whether states were immune from liability under
the federal patent laws. 4'
HOweVer, the Supreme Court recently modified the rules of anal-
ysis to be applied in state eleventh amendment immunity cases, In
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,4 2 the Supreme Court greatly nar-
rowed its Fitzpatrick holding by announcing a new test which re-
quired that "Congress must express its intention to abrogate the
eleventh amendment in unmistakable language in the statute it-
self. ' 43 The Court in Atascadero stated that a general authorization
by Congress was not enough. Congress must express its intent to
abrogate State immunity "unequivocally'" 44 and "specifically, ' ' 5 thus
making its intention "unmistakably clear in the language of the stat-
ute.' 46
On its face, the Atascadero test seems very reasonable. After all,
Congress should be required to make its intention clear on such a
Weighty matter as state immunity. However, the application of the
Atascadero test is creating some problematic distortions in the law.
The Supreme Court has changed the "test" that federal statutes must
pass and is applying that test retroactively. When Congress passed
statutes such as the federal copyright and patent laws, it assumed that
the courts would look to the legislative history if there was a dispute
as to Congress' intent. However, the Atascadero test has completely
40. See e.g., Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd. 814 F.2d
290 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding state immune); Johnson v. University of Va. 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D.
Va. 1985) (holding state not immune); Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding state immune); Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Assoc. Inc., No.
83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd, No. 86-3354 (lth Cir. Jan. 27, 1987)
(per curiam) (holding state immune).
41. Cf. Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn. 1972)
(holding that a state agency is immune from suit in federal court for damages for patent infringement)
with Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. I11. 1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar a damage suit against a state agency for patent infringement in federal court).
42. In Atascadero, an unsuccessful applicant for a position with a state hospital sued the state
under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, alleging that the hospital denied him
employment solely because of his physical handicaps. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 236.
43. Id. at 243.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 246.
46. Id. at 242.
[Vol. 92
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done away with the long established legal principle that courts will
look to legislative history in determining legislative intent.47 Consid-
ering that even today it is not entirely certain what "unmistakably
clear" words must be included in a federal statute in order to abrogate
state immunity, it hardly seems reasonable to require that Congress
have anticipated that such words would be required and then have
defined what those words would be.
In Atascadero, the Court only applied the strict new test to the
"direct abrogation" exception to state immunity. However, in a sub-
sequent case, Welch v. Texas State Dep't of Highways and Public
Transp.,48 the Supreme Court held that the Atascadero test of Con-
gressional intent also applied to the "implied waiver" exception to
47. In Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989), the father of a child with a learning disability
sued the State under the federal Education of the Handicapped Act. Id. at 2398-99. The Supreme
Court in Dellmuth made it very clear that courts should not look to legislative history in applying
the Atascadero test.
Lest Atascadero be thought to contain any ambiguity, we reaffirm today that in this area
of the law, evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual ....
In particular, we reject the approach of the court of appeals, according to which, '[wihile
the text of the federal legislation must bear evidence of such an intention, the legislative
history may still be used as a resource in determining whether Congress' intention to lift
the bar has been made sufficiently manifest.' 839 F.2d, at 128. Legislative history generally
will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intends to abrogate the eleventh
amendment. If Congress' intention is 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,'
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably
clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of Atas-
cadero will not be met.
Id. at 2401.
The dissenting opinion in Dellmuth, (written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens), refused to ignore legislative history and instead "[applied] the standard method
for ascertaining congressional intent" and looked to the legislative history of the statute as well as
the text. Id. at 2403.
In Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989), the Court
reaffirmed that courts should not look to legislative history in applying the Atascadero test. Id. at
2824. But also in Hoffman, the same four dissenting Justices from Dellmuth again refused to ignore
legislative history. Id. at 2824-27.
48. In Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987), an em-
ployee of the Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation sued the Department and
the State under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, for injuries she suffered while working on a ferry
dock. Id. at 2942. The Court in Welch noted that granting the State immunity from suit in federal
court would not leave the injured plaintiff without a remedy. "Welch is not without remedy: She
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state immunity which had been created in Parden.49 Thus, Congress'
intention to condition participation in a federally regulated program
on a state's consent to suit, must be "unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute." It is now clear that the new test required by
Atascadero and affirmed by Welch has changed the rules for the
"implied waiver" exception as well as for the "direct abrogation"
exception. 0
Although both the "implied waiver" and the "direct abrogation"
exceptions must meet the Atascadero test, there is still a doctrinal
distinction between these two approaches. Under the direct abrogation
approach, the removal of the protection of state immunity is unilateral
on the part of Congress. The states are not given a chance to preserve
their sovereign immunity. Therefore, when Congress is legislating un-
der a particular constitutional power (e.g., the Commerce Clause, the
Patent and Copyright Clause), Congress must also have the power to
abrogate state immunity under that constitutional clause.
The implied waiver doctrine, on the other hand, reserves the ul-
timate decision of immunity to the states, because a state may avoid
suit in federal court by opting out of a given federal program. How-
ever, in many cases, a state's power to opt out cannot be realistically
exercised. For example, a state cannot realistically opt out of partic-
ipating in the use and creation of copyrighted materials.5t Because the
49. "The questions presented in the petition for certiorari are: . . . [w]hether the doctrine of
implied waiver of sovereign immunity as set forth in Parden is still viable." Id. at 2946 n.4 (citation
omitted).
The Court in Welch then held that "to the extent that Parden . . . is inconsistent with the
requirement that an abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed is
unmistakably clear language, it is overruled." Id. at 2948. Thus the "implied waiver" exception to
state immunity is still valid. However, a federal statute now has to pass the Atascadero test of
Congressional intent before a court can find an implied waiver of state immunity.
50. The Welch Court made clear that, to the extent earlier precedent may have suggested a
more flexible approach, that precedent should be disregarded. Lane, 871 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).
"[Tihe slate seems to have been wiped clean; in the post-Atascadero era, no court to our knowl-
edge has held that the Copyright Act passes the reformulated test for abrogation of eleventh amend-
ment protection." Id.
"[lI]t is clear that Atascadero changed the rules for abrogation." Brown, State Sovereignty Under
the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth, 74 GEo. L.J.
363, 383 (1985).
51. Also, until there is Congressional legislation, implied waiver is not a useful doctrine in the
copyright and patent context because there is no language in the federal copyright or patent statutes
expressly conditioning a State's use of copyrighted or patented materials upon that State's consent
to suit in federal court.
[Vol. 92
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implied waiver doctrine is based on the notion that a state has "con-
structively consented" to suit, it appears that the implied doctrine does
not require that Congress be "found" by the courts to have the con-
stitutional power to abrogate state immunity.5 2 Under the implied waiver
doctrine, a state gives its consent to suit by participating in a given
federal program. However, it is important to note that the Supreme
Court appears reluctant to apply the implied waiver doctrine because
"[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with
the surrender of constitutional rights. ' 53 Apparently at least four of
the Supreme Court Justices find very little remaining distinction be-
tween the "implied waiver" and the "direct abrogation" approaches
to state eleventh amendment immunity.5 4.
Because the continued future of the implied waiver doctrine is
somewhat in question, the "direct abrogation" approach appears to
be the sounder approach. However, under the direct abrogation ap-
52. The Court stated in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), that "[a]
State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity ... [by] waiving its immunity in suit
in the context of a particular federal program." Id. at 238 n.l. But the Court went on to say that
a State's participation in programs funded under a federal statute was not sufficient to effectuate a
waiver because Congress had not manifested "a clear intent to condition participation in the programs
funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity." Id. at 247. For a
further discussion, see Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Prerog-
ative, 67 TEx. L. REv. 685, 757 n.354 (1989).
53. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238 n.1 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
673 (1974)).
Also, Eleventh Amendment Supreme Court opinions after Welch have based their holdings on
direct abrogation, but have not directly addressed the continued applicability of implied waiver.
54.
[T]o acknowledge that the Federal Government can make the waiver of state sovereign
immunity a condition to the State's action in a field that Congress has authority to regulate,
is substantially the same as acknowledging that the Federal Government can eliminate state
sovereign immunity in the exercise of its Article I powers-that is, to adopt the very principle
I have just rejected. There is little more than a verbal distinction between saying that Con-
gress can make the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania liable to private parties for hazardous-
waste-clean-up costs on sites that the Commonwealth owns and operates, and saying the
same thing but adding at the end 'if the Commonwealth chooses to own and operate them.'
If state sovereignty has any reality, it must mean more than this.
Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
But apparently a majority of the Court was unwilling, at least in this case, to merge the "implied
waiver" doctrine with the "direct abrogation" doctrine. The plurality opinion in the same case, Union
Gas Co., stated that "[slince Union Gas Co. itself eschews reliance on the theory of waiver we
announced in Parden ... we neither discuss this theory here nor understand why the dissent feels
the need to do so." Id. at 2286 n.5.
1990]
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proach, the issue of congressional power to abrogate state immunity
becomes critical. The Court in Fitzpatrick held that Congress could
directly abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity when Con-
gress was acting pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
The issue remained as to whether Congress could directly abrogate
the state's eleventh amendment immunity when Congress was acting
pursuant to other constitutional powers, particularly powers enumer-
ated before the eleventh amendment was ratified.
The Supreme Court in Welch acknowledged that the scope of con-
gressional power to abrogate state immunity was a fundamental issue
which had yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court. The Welch
Court assumed, "without deciding or intimating a view of the ques-
tion, that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting states to
suit in federal courts is not confined to § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment."55 Likewise, in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, the
Supreme Court assumed that Congress had the authority to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its
article I power under the Commerce Clause. 6
Thus the issue of whether or not Congress has the power to ab-
rogate state immunity pursuant to the Patent and Copyright Clause
is a primary issue under the direct abrogation approach. Congress can
always amend the federal copyright and patent laws in order to satisfy
the strict Atascadero test. However, should the Supreme Court find
that Congress does not have the constitutional power to abrogate state
immunity under the Patent and Copyright Clause, then states will be
immune from copyright and patent infringement suits for damages
regardless of what Congress does. 7
III. REMAINWG IssuEs
The primary issue remaining to be resolved by the Supreme Court
is whether Congress has the power to abrogate state immunity when
55. Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2946.
56. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 251-52 (1985); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
57. If Congress is found to lack the constitutional authority, the only recourse that would allow
suits against States in federal court would be a constitutional amendment.
[Vol. 92
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legislating pursuant to the Constitution's article 1, section 8, Patent
and Copyright Clause. 8 If the Supreme Court holds that Congress
does not have this power under the Patent and Copyright Clause,
then there is no further point in looking to the language of the federal
copyright and patent laws. If Congress does not have the power under
the Constitution to abrogate state immunity, it cannot create that power
by legislation. But if the Supreme Court holds that Congress does
indeed have this power under the Patent and Copyright Clause, then
the Court must make a further inquiry as to whether or not the lan-
guage of the federal copyright and patent statutes meets the stringent
test put forth in Atascadero and reiterated in Welch.
It is important to note that the policy considerations cited by courts
to support the doctrine of eleventh amendment state immunity do not
apply in copyright and patent infringement cases. The two policy goals
of eleventh amendment state immunity are: (1) to prevent an undue
drain on state treasuries; and (2) to maintain a balance of power
between state and federal courts. 9 As to the first policy, states can
prevent an undue drain on their treasuries merely by complying with
the federal copyright and patent laws. All that states have to do is
pay for copyrighted material and for patent rights just as everyone
else, including the federal government, is required to do. As to the
second policy, because federal courts already have exclusive jurisdic-
tion in copyright and patent cases, there is no struggle for power and
jurisdiction between state and federal courts. 6 In fact, in patent and
copyright cases, the choice is not between a federal court and a state
court, but between a federal court and not court.
61
58. The Patent and Copyright Clause states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59. "[P]olicies [behind the eleventh amendment] include preventing a drain on state treasuries,
see Edelman v. Jordan, 4!5 U.S. 651, 663-68 (1974), and limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
See Atascadero, 473 U.S. 242-43 (1985)." BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1399-400, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1557 (1989).
60. "The [Copyright] Act does not itself provide for federal jurisdiction over suits brought
pursuant to its provisions. Because of the need for national uniformity of copyright law, however,
Congress has separately provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the
[Copyright] Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)." Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 118, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
61. In most cases, 'in determining whether Congress has abrogated the States' eleventh
1990)
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A. Does Congress Have the Power to Abrogate State Immunity
When Legislating Pursuant to the Patent and Copyright Clause?
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
A recent Supreme Court case, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
addressed the question of whether Congress has the authority to over-
ride state immunity when legislating pursuant to the Constitution's
article I, section 8, Commerce Clause.62 This issue arose in a dispute
over state liability for waste cleanup costs under Congress' Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980613 as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act of 1986.64
Because of the splintered nature of the decision, the following table
is offered as an aid in understanding who is agreeing with whom on
the issue of Congress' constitutional authority to abrogate state im-
munity under the article I Commerce Clause.
YES, Congress has authority NO, Congress does not have
authority
Brennan Stevens White Scalia O'Connor
Opinion Concurring Concurring Dissenting Dissenting
of the Opinion Opinion Opinion Opinion
Court




amendment immunity, the courts themselves must decide whether their own jurisdiction has
been expanded.' [Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)] .... Here,
however, a holding that Congress has abrogated immunity in the Copyright Act could not
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, because the federal courts already have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over copyright actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). The Copyright Act, more-
over, preempts all state copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Thus the choice is not between
the federal forum and the state forum - it is between the federal forum and no forum.
BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
62. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (plurality opinion).
63. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (which was amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986).
64. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
[Vol. 92
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In a 5-4 plurality opinion, the Court held that "Congress has
the authority to render [States] .. .liable when legislating pursuant
to the Commerce Clause." ' 6  The plurality opinion, authored by
Justice Brennan, based this conclusion on the fact that states had
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they had ratified
the Constitution and originally granted Congress the power to reg-
ulate commerce. The plurality on this issue included Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Stevens and White. It is important to note that a
fifth justice joined Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stev-
ens, which allowed them to form a new majority in an eleventh
amendment state sovereign immunity decision.
However, Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in which he
stated that he disagreed with much of the majority's reasoning, al-
though he agreed with the majority's conclusion that Congress had
the authority under article I to abrogate the state's eleventh amend-
ment immunity. 66 Most unfortunately, Justice White said nothing
whatsoever about the reasoning that brought him to join the ma-
jority. It is quite clear, however, that Justice White was unwilling
to explicitly overrule Hans. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens all stated that they believe that Hans should be over-
ruled, 67 but Justice White was unwilling to do so.68
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, again expressed the view
so often expressed by him and Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun, that the Court should overrule Hans v. Louisiana and
its progeny in favor of a more literal and narrow interpretation of
the eleventh amendment. Justice Stevens advocated interpreting the
eleventh amendment as only limiting the citizen-state and alien-state
65. Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (plurality opinion).
66.
This brings me to the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to abrogate
the States' immunity. In that respect, I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan
•.. that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the eleventh amendment
immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much of his reasoning.
Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2295 (White, J., concurring).
67. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
68. "I reiterate my view that, for the reasons stated by the plurality in Welch v. Texas Dept.
of Highways .... 107 S. Ct., at 2944-57, Hans v. Louisiana should not be overruled." Pennsylvania,
109 S. Ct. at 2295 n.8 (White J., concurring).
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jurisdiction of federal courts, and not limiting the federal courts'
jurisdictional power in cases involving federal statutes."
The dissent on the issue of Congress' power to abrogate state
immunity was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Rehn-
quist, O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Scalia supported the ex-
panded interpretation of the eleventh amendment which was first
espoused by the Court in Hans.70 Scalia agreed with the majority
that "[States] shall be immune from suits, without their consent,
save where there has been a 'surrender of this immunity in the plan
of the convention.' The Federalist, No. 81. ''71 However, Scalia dis-
agreed with the majority as to how much power the states had sur-
rendered when they ratified the Constitution. Scalia also argued that
it was unfair to allow the federal government immunity from private
suit, and yet not allow the states the same immunity. 2 In his dissent,
Justice Scalia correctly pointed out that there were other remedies
available to an aggrieved plaintiff.73 First, a plaintiff may obtain a
federal injunction against the state official in order to stop the un-
lawful action.74 Second, a plaintiff may obtain money damages
against state officials personally, rather than in their official ca-
69. Id. at 2286-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70.
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article
III, or assume that the letter of the eleventh amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are pos-
tulates which limit and control .. . . [One of which is] the postulate that State of the
Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their
consent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the con-
vention.' The Federalist, No. 81.
Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 322-323 (1934)).
71. Id.
72. "I think it possible to find in the scheme of the Constitution a necessity that private remedies
be expanded ... to include a remedy not available, for a similar infraction, against the United States
itself." Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It is important to note that Justice Scalia's argument is a very strong one for the opposing
viewpoint in the copyright and patent context. Justice Scalia is arguing that there is an unfairness in
holding states amenable to suit when the federal government can claim immunity. But likewise, In
the copyright and patent context, it is unfair for the federal government to be amenable to suit, as
it is, and yet allow States to claim immunity.
73. Id.
74. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
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pacity.75 Third, local governments and municipalities are not covered
by the shield of sovereign immunity and may be sued directly for
damages. 76 These other remedies, however, may be grossly inade-
quate in copyright and patent infringement suits. In the first case,
an injunction is not helpful if the copying and the gain from it have
already been realized. In the second case, the Court has made it
clear that state officials cannot be personally sued if "the state is
the real, substantial party in interest. ' ' 77 And in the third case, the
fact that a plaintiff is able to sue a local government is of no use
to the plaintiff if the infringing party is a state.
Justice Scalia then made an unusual, but refreshing, admission
for a Supreme Court Justice. Justice Scalia admitted that his view
of eleventh amendment state sovereign immunity may possibly be
wrong. He went on to say that Hans has been used too often as a
precedent to overrule it.71 Justice Scalia strongly implied that he
would rather join Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in
explicitly overruling Hans than allow the present plurality viewpoint
to continue as the law of the land. 9
As the Supreme Court has chosen not to grant certiorari in a
copyright infringement case against a state, 80 and thus has not spo-
75. Justice Scalia's dissent in Union Gas Co., cites Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) as standing for the proposition that "[a citizen] may obtain money
damages against state officers [in their individual capacities]." Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2298 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
76. "[T]here is no tradition of [Eleventh Amendment] immunity for municipal corporations."
Id. at 2280 n.3 (plurality opinion) (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)).
77. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of
Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
78. "Even if I were wrong, however, about the original meaning of the Constitution, or the
assumption adopted by the eleventh amendment, or the structural necessity for federal-question suits
against the States, it cannot possibly be denied that the question is at least very close. In that situation,
the mere venerability of an answer consistently adhered to for almost a century, and the difficulty
of changing, or even clearly identifying, the intervening law that has been based on that answer,
strongly argue against a change." Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. "Better to overrule Hans, I should think, than to perpetuate the complexities that it creates,
see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 252-258 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), but
eliminate all its benefits to the federal system .... As far as I can discern, the course the Court
today pursues-preserving Hans but permitting Congress to overrule it-achieves the worst of both
worlds. And it is a course no more justified by text than by consequences." Id. at 2299.
80. Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1171 (1989); BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
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ken directly on the issue, how should the Supreme Court's decision
in Union Gas Co. affect lower court decisions regarding copyright
and patent infringement suits against the states? Union Gas Co. dealt
with Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause of article I,
section 8. However, the Court's reasoning in Union Gas Co. also
applies to the Patent and Copyright Clause of article I, section 8.
The Court's rationale was that "Congress has the authority to
render [States] ... liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce
Clause" because the states had surrendered a portion of their sov-
ereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate com-
merce. 81 Following the Court's reasoning to its fullest extent, if
Congress has the power to directly abrogate state immunity because
the state had consented to suit when they originally ratified the Con-
stitution, it logically follows that Congress can use the direct ab-
rogation approach under any of its original constitutional powers.82
The Court's rationale certainly applies to the other article I plenary
powers, including the Patent and Copyright Clause, which allows
Congress to enact uniform nationwide legislation.83
81. Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (plurality opinion).
82.
[I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Con-
stitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she
deny to the general government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though they
may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had not
been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a
corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of
them.
Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2282 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346
(1880)). The Court also mentions that this statement was quoted by the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1976). Id.
The Court then went on to say: "[blecause the Commerce Clause withholds power from the
States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred
would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the
extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their
immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. The
States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus not "unconsenting"; they gave their
consent all at once, in ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than on a
"case-by-case basis." Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2284 (plurality opinion).
83. "Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one hand gives power to
Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States .... The [Commerce Clause]
both expands federal power and contracts state power; that is the meaning, in fact, of a 'plenary'
20
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In fact, Justice White's concurring opinion states that "I agree
with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan . . . that Congress
has the authority under article I to abrogate the eleventh amendment
immunity of the States. ' 84 Although he disagreed with the Court's
view, Justice Scalia in his dissent stated that "if the article I com-
merce power enables abrogation of state sovereign immunity, so do
all the other article I powers." 8 5 Thus it appears that the Court's
decision in Union Gas Co. can be interpreted to stand for the prop-
osition that Congress has the authority to override state immunity
when legislating pursuant to the Constitution's article I, section 8,
Patent and Copyright Clause.
Assuming that Congress has the authority to override state im-
munity in the federal copyright and patent statutes, the next issue
to address is whether Congress has actually done so.
B. Does the Language of the Copyright Act Meet the
Atascadero Test? Copyright Cases Since Atascadero
The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal that have examined the Cop-
yright Act of 197686 have unanimously held, albeit with some re-
luctance, that the Copyright Act does not pass the Atascadero
requirement "that Congress must express its intention to abrogate
the eleventh amendment in unmistakable language in the statute it-
self. '"87 The Circuit Courts have been very concerned with the un-
grant of authority." Id. at 2282.
"It is no accident, therefore, that every Court of Appeals to have reached this issue has concluded
that congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to
the plenary powers granted it by the Constitution." Id. at 2281.
84. Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2295 (White, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
87. Quote is from the holding in Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243.
See Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 117 cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989); BV
Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400 cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989); Lane, 871 F.2d at 169-70. See also
Note, Sovereign Immunity to Copyright Infringement Actions after Atascadero, 50 Omo ST. L.J.
197, 201-05 (1989).
As a side note, there are two other copyright infringement cases which were decided right after
Atascadero and which are of less importance. In Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Assoc.
Inc., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd, No. 86-3354, slip op. (11th
Cir. Jan. 27, 1987) (per curiam) (officials of a Florida State University allegedly infringed copyrights
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fairness of allowing a State to claim immunity when one of its
employees pirates copyrighted materials.8 8 It seems unreasonable to
allow a state university or state agency to pirate all of the computer
software, textbooks, films, etc. . . . that it wants without requiring
that university or agency to pay a fair price, just as the federal
government or any other entity is required to do by law, 9
It is quite clear from three U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal cases
that the Copyright Act of 1976, as it now stands, will not be found
to pass the Atascadero test of unmistakable clarity. However, these
decisions will soon lose their value as precedent because Congress
in architectural plans for a student housing project), the district court held that the State was immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Unfortunately, the district court never discussed the Alas-
cadero decision or the statutes that it claimed it had reviewed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision without discussion. Because of its limited dis-
cussion, this case will offer very sparse guidance to other courts.
Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Il. 1985) (Illinois state
agency sought a declaratory judgment that the Eleventh Amendment barred defendant's potential
copyright claim concerning the State's use of a slogan in a tourism campaign). Woelffer, decided
immediately after Atascadero, held that the Copyright Act of 1976 did not pass the Atascaddro test.
The district court decision was never appealed to a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
88.
Although we find these arguments compelling, we are constrained by the Supreme Court's
mandate that we find an abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity only when Congress
has included in the statute unequivocal and specific language indicating an intent to subject
states to suit in federal court. Such language is absent from the Copyright Act of 1976.
We recognize that our holding will allow states to violate the federal copyright laws with
virtual impunity. It is for Congress, however, to remedy this problem.
BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400 cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
the plaintiff's second point is more troubling. If the Eleventh Amendment holds sway, suit
cannot be brought in federal court against an infringing State, which means that no damage
action under the Copyright Act can be brought at all. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
In that important sense, Congress will have crafted a right for which it ceded no corre-
sponding remedy against certain infringers. We are not unmindful of the seeming inequities
of this result, nor of its apparent inconsistency with the broad powers granted Congress
under the Copyright and Patent Clause .... By the same token, we see few countervailing
policy considerations.
Lane, 871 F.2d at 173 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
89. Barabara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights, in testimony to Congress, stated that Con-
gress should amend the federal Copyright laws as soon as possible because copyright owners were
already at a bargaining disadvantage from the perception that state instrumentalities were free to use
copyrighted materials without paying for them. She then posed the following query: "When an ad-
ministrator with a sharply restricted budget asks her lawyer whether she must take licenses for some
massive use-such as cut-and-paste anthologies or systematic off-air taping of copyrighted motion
pictures for classroom use-what do you think the lawyer is going to say?" 38 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 939, at 290 (July 20, 1989).
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is in the process of amending the Copyright Act of 1976. Congress'
express purpose in amending the Copyright Act is to "unmistakably
clarify" that they intended to abrogate the states' eleventh amend-
ment immunity when they passed the Copyright Act of 1976.90
1. Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown
Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown,91 was the first case
to apply the new and very strict Atascadero test to the Copyright
Act of 1976 in order to determine whether Congress had "ex-
press[ed] its intention to abrogate the eleventh amendment in un-
mistakable language in the statute itself.' '92 The case involved a
copyright infringement suit brought by Richard Anderson Photog-
raphy (Anderson) against, among others, Radford University (an
educational institution of the State of Virginia). Pursuant to a con-
tract with Radford University, Anderson took photographs to be
used in the 1982 student prospectus. Anderson obtained copyrights
for the photographs used in the publication. Anderson then sued
for copy right infringement when the school used his photographs
in other publications without his authorization.
The court in Richard Anderson Photography held that the lan-
guage of the Copyright Act of 197691 does not indicate an "une-
quivocal" intent on the part of Congress to directly abrogate state
immunity or to condition a state's participation in the Scheme of
federal copyright law upon the state's constructive consent to suit
in federal courts. 94 In applying the Atascadero test, the court found
that the phrase in the Copyright Act of 1976 which states that
"[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights ... is an
90, See supra note 4.
91. Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 117 cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
92. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243.
93, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. (1976).
94.
Applying the Atascaderol Welch test, we hold that, laying aside all questions of its con-
stitutional power to abrogate by either means, Congress has not in the Copyright Act so
unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate either directly, without regard to consent,
or indirectly by exacting consent as a condition of participation, as to allow us to find an
override of the eleventh amendment immunity here invoked by the state defendants.
Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 117, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
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infringer" 95 did not express an "unequivocal" intent on the part of
Congress to allow private damage suits against the states. 96
The court also discussed § 110(2) of the Copyright Act of 197697
which exempts from copyright infringement liability certain activities
involving officers or employees of "governmental bodies." 98 An-
derson, the copyright owner argued that these exemptions would not
make sense unless "governmental bodies," which included states,
were liable to begin with under other sections of the Copyright Act.
The court found these statements ambiguous because the statute
never explicitly defined "governmental bodies" to include "States."
The court reasoned that this section could possibly be interpreted
to apply only to local governments, and that therefore Congress'
intent was not "unequivocal" as was required by the Supreme Court
in Atascadero and Welch. Although it examined many sections of
the Copyright Act individually, the court did not find a single section
which showed an "unequivocal" intent on the part of Congress to
allow private damage suits against the states. 99 Also, because the
95. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
96. Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 121, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1976).
98. Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 119-20, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
99. The court split the analysis into two parts. First, the court looked for congressional intent
to directly abrogate the State's immunity.
We therefore look to other provisions of the [Copyright] Act which Anderson and associated
amici contend make congressional intention to abrogate sufficiently clear when read in
conjunction with the basic provisions just discussed. The provisions on which Anderson
relies are 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108, 110(2), 110(6), 111(a), 112, 118(d)(3), 601 and 602. We
consider them in order.
Id. at 118.
The court then discussed all of the above sections and held that "the language of the Copyright
Act, considered as a whole, does not clearly and unequivocally indicate Congress's [sic] intent to
create a cause of action for money damages enforceable against the states in federal courts, thereby
directly abrogating the state's eleventh amendment immunity." Id. at 120.
Second, the court looked for congressional intent to impliedly waive the State's immunity.
Here, the critical language of the Copyright Act, as analyzed ... above, no more une-
quivocally expresses an intention to condition participation by the states upon their con-
structive consent to suit than it does to effect a direct abrogation of their immunity without
regard to their actual or constructive consent. Cf. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946-48 (applying
parallel tests of congressional intent to both "direct abrogation" and "constructive consent"
contentions); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-47 (same). For these reasons, we hold that there
has been no implied waiver of eleventh amendment immunity by the Commonwealth's par-
ticipation in federally regulated copyright activity.
Id. at 121-22 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 92
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court found that the Copyright Act failed the Atascadero test, it
did not have to reach the question of whether Congress had the
power under the Patent and Copyright Clause to directly abrogate
state eleventh amendment immunity. 1°°
2. BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., Los Angeles
The next court to apply the Atascadero test to the Copyright
Act of 1976 was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in BV Engineering v. University of Cal., Los Angeles.01 The material
facts in this case were undisputed. The University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) purchased one copy of each of seven copyrighted
computer programs and the accompanying user manuals which were
sold by BV Engineering. UCLA then proceeded to make three copies
of each computer program and ten copies of each users manual.
BV Engineering sued UCLA for copyright infringement.
The Court assumed, without deciding, that Congress could ab-
rogate the State's eleventh amendment immunity when acting under
an article I power. 0 2 The Court then found that, although the Cop-
yright Act of 1976 could reasonably be construed to allow damage
suits against the states, the language of the Act did not satisfy the
Atascadero test requiring that Congress' intent be "unmistakably
clear" in the language of the statute.103 The court noted that al-
though they had been forced by the Supreme Court's decision in
100. "[Bjecause resolving that issue, [congressional intent], may avoid the need to address any
more fundamental issues of Congress' constitutional power to abrogate, see Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), we look first to the issue of
congressional intent. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946-47." Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d
at 117, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989) (citation omitted).
101. BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1397-99, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
102.
A decision on this issue may be forthcoming. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
in a case that endorsed the view that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 832
F.2d 1343 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. granted. Because the issue is pending before the Supreme
Court, we decline to reach it here. We assume, without deciding, that Congress may abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity when acting under an Article I power.
BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1397, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989) (citation omitted).
103. "Because these sections [of the Copyright Act] are susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, we cannot conclude that they satisfy Atascadero's requirement of clear and unmis-
takable language." BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1399, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
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Atascadero to hold as they did, they realized that their decision
appeared contrary to the Supreme Court's intent to protect copy-
rights. t04
The court also recognized the injustice of its holding, 05 but again
stated that it was constrained by the Supreme Court's mandate in
Atascadero.0 6 The court found that the policy arguments supporting
a finding of eleventh amendment state immunity were not present
in this case. State immunity was not needed to prevent a drain on
state treasuries. 10 7 Also, because federal courts already have exclusive
jurisdiction in copyright cases, 08 there is no expansion of federal
court power at the expense of state court power. 09
3. Lane Y. First Nat'l Bank of Boston
The most recent court to apply the Atascadero test to the Cop-
yright Act of 1976 was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston."0 In Lane, a woman
sued the State of Massachusetts and several of its agencies for in-
fringing her copyrights in certain compilations of financial data.
Like the court in BVEngineering, the First Circuit assumed, without
104. The Ninth Circuit, in BY Eng'g, noted that the Supreme Court itself had suggested that
even the States must honor a copyright owner's monopoly. "When Congress grants an exclusive right
or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach." Id. at 1399 (quoting
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) which was referring to the Copyright Act of 1909).
105. "We recognize that our holding will allow states to violate the federal copyright laws with
virtual impunity. It is for Congress, however, to remedy this problem." BVEng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
106. "Although we find these arguments compelling, we are constrained by the Supreme Court's
mandate that we find an abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity only when Congress has included
in the statute unequivocal and specific language indicating an intent to subject states to suit in federal
court." Id.
107. "[P]olicies [behind the Eleventh Amendment] include preventing a drain on state treasuries,
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-68 (1974)." Id. at 1399 (citation omitted).
108. "The [Copyright] Act does not itself provide for federal jurisdiction over suits brought
pursuant to its provisions. Because of the need for national uniformity of copyright law, however,
Congress has separately provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the
[Copyright] Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)." Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 118, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
109. See supra note 59.
110. Lane, 871 F.2d at 168-72.
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deciding, that Congress could abrogate the state's eleventh amend-
ment immunity when acting under an article I power."'
The court then noted that the only cases concluding that Con-
gress had indeed abrogated state immunity in the Copyright Act had
been cases decided before the Supreme Court's Atascadero deci-
sion. 112 Citing the BV Eng'g and Richard Anderson Photography
cases, the court agreed that there was indeed ambiguity in the stat-
utory language of the Copyright Act both as to particular sections
and as to the Act as a whole.
Like the court in BV Eng'g, the court in Lane recognized the
injustice of its holding, but stated that it was constrained by the
Supreme Court's mandate in Atascadero."3 Likewise, the Lane court
found that the policy arguments supporting a finding of eleventh
amendment state immunity were not present in this case." 4 The Lane
111.
It is an open question whether Congress possesses the power to blunt the prophylaxis of
the Eleventh Amendment when acting pursuant to the Copyright and Patent Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.... The Court has recently granted certiorari and heard oral
argument on much the same question, but has yet to resolve it. See United States v. Union
Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988) (Commerce
Clause). Intriguing though the tangram may be, we need not strain to solve it today. The
case at hand is so postured that we can emulate the Court and 'assume, without deciding
or intimating a view of the question, that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting
States to suit in federal court is not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Lane, 871 F.2d at 168 (citation omitted) (quoting Welch v. Texas State Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2946 (1987)).
112.
Although some courts had earlier concluded that Congress, by passing the Copyright Act,
intended to remove the States' immunity, see e.g., Mills Music, Inc. 591 F.2d at 1284-86;
Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Va. 1985), the slate seems
to have been wiped clean; in the post-Atascadero era, no court to our knowledge has held
that the Copyright Act passes the reformulated test for abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
protection. In addition to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, every district court-including
those which initially considered the BV Eng'g and Richard Anderson Photography cases-
has come out the other way. See, e.g., Cardinal Indus. Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Assoc.,
No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd mem., 811 F.2d 609 11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 88 (1987); Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp.
499, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Lane, 871 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).
113. See supra note 86 quoting Lane, 871 F.2d at 173.
114. [W]e see few countervailing policy considerations. The concerns which undergird the Elev-
enth Amendment-comity and solicitude for State interest, e.g., Della Grotta v. State of Rhode Island,
781 F.2d 343, 347 (Ist Cir. 1986); regard for undue fiscal impact upon State coffers, e.g. Edelman,
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court also acknowledged that the last major revision of the federal
copyright law (resulting in the Copyright Act of 1976) was under-
taken before the Atascadero and Welch Supreme Court decisions
and that Congress most likely expected that the standard rules of
statutory interpretation would apply, rather than the unusually strict
standard enounced in Atascadero and reaffirmed in Welch." 5 The
court then ended, as did the BV Eng'g court, with a statement that
it was not within their power to remedy this problem, but that a
solution must come from Congress."16
C. Does the Language of the Federal Patent Laws Meet the
Atascadero Test?- The Only Patent Case Since Atascadero
1. Chew v. California-A Case of First Impression
In Chew v. California,"7 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was the first appellate court, subsequent to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Atascadero, to address the issue of whether states
are immune from damage suits under the federal patent laws." 8 The
court held that the text of the patent statute did not satisfy the
Atascadero test which required that Congress' intent be "unmis-
415 U.S. at 663-68; containment of federal court jurisdiction, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43-
seem little furthered by hewing strictly to the party line in the copyright context. See BV Eng'g, 858
F.2d at 1399-1400; see also Note, Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 86 COLUM.
L. REv. 1436, 1450-51 (1986) (where, as in the case of the Copyright Act, a statute'simpact on state
sovereignty is less intrusive, the need for a specific showing of congressional intent should logically
be diminished). "In short, we are constrained by the Court's directives, first in Atascadero and
thereafter in Welch, to ignore the policy concerns evoked by exclusivity of jurisdiction .... ." Atas-
cadero, 473 U.S. at 243; see also Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946 (quoting Atascadero).
Lane, 871 F.2d at 173-74 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 175-76.
116. "[T]he States-pending some future action by the Congress-continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity in regard to damage suits charging copyright infringement." Id. at 176.
"We recognize that our holding will allow states to violate the federal copyright laws with virtual
impunity. It is for Congress, however, to remedy this problem." BV Eng'g, 858 F.2d at 1400 cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989).
117. Chew v. California, No. S-88-245 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 1988), reprinted in 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1159, aff'd, No. 89-1390 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 1990) (WEsTLAW, 1990 WL 108).
118. Federal patent statutes comprise all of Title 35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982). The federal
copyright statutes comprise all of Title 17. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
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takably clear" in the language of the statute. 1 9 The court, therefore,
did not have to address the underlying issue of Congress' power to
abrogate state eleventh amendment immunity under the Patent and
Copyright Clause.120 As a result of this decision it is clear that the
federal patent statutes, as presently worded, have failed the Atas-
cadero test, just as the federal copyright statutes have failed in recent
decisions.
D. What Language is Required to Meet the Atascadero Test?
The Atascadero test'2' is a very subjective test. 22 The test itself
gives Congress very little concrete guidance as to how to write leg-
islation that will pass its requirement of "unmistakable clarity."
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., gave the most explicit guidelines available since the Court
enounced the test in Atascadero. 13 It appears that an explicit state-
119.
The question of whether the eleventh amendment immunity has been abrogated has been
addressed in a number of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. While the Justices have
expressed differing opinions on the limits of congressional power to abrogate states' im-
munity under the delegated powers (see, e.g., the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Union Gas), even under the broadest view of the power to abrogate, Congress must make
its intent to do so unmistakably clear. In Atascadero, the Court stated: "Congress must
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the
statute itself." Evidence of such congressional intent must be both "unequivocal and textual."
The district court examined the text of the patent statute and rejected Chew's argument that 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1982) contains the requisite intent. In pertinent part, § 271(a) reads: "WHOEVER without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent." We agree that the
general term "whoever" is not the requisite unmistakable language of congressional intent necessary
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Chew, No. 89-1390 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 3, 1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (WEsTLAW,
1990 WL 108, at 7).
120. "Assuming that Congress has the power to subject the states to patent infringement suits,
a complex question we do not resolve herein, we conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
that Congress has evidenced no intent to exercise such power in the patent statute." Id. at 6.
121. "[V]e hold-consistent with Quern, Edelman, and Pennhurst I--that Congress must ex-
press its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself."
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243.
122. "[Judges can disagree about the content and rigor of the standard of "unmistakable clarity,"
and if they do, they are likely to reach different results on States' amenability to suit for reasons
having nothing to do with the statutory language itself." Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2278 n.2 (plurality
opinion).
123.
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, 100 Stat.
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ment that "a state shall not be immune under the eleventh amend-
ment from suit in federal court for a violation of this Act" will
pass the strict Atascadero test. But it is very unclear what lesser
statement will suffice.
In Atascadero, four Justices were of the opinion that the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 met the Atascadero test, while five Justices
disagreed. 124 In Union Gas Co., five Justices were of the opinion
that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 met the Atascadero test, while four
Justices disagreed. 125 Considering the narrow majorities in these de-
cisions, it would appear that Congress runs the risk of being mis-
interpreted if it does not expressly state in the language of a statute
that it is abrogating the eleventh amendment immunity of the States
and allowing them to be sued for damages in federal court for a
violation of the statute. Because there is still some ambiguity as to
whether or not Congress has the power to "directly abrogate" the
states' eleventh amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to
the Patent and Copyright Clause, it would be prudent for Congress
to use both the "direct abrogation" approach and the "implied
waiver" approach. To do this, Congress should include two separate
statements of abrogation in any amendment to the federal copyright
and patent laws. The first statement should clearly state Congress'
intent to "directly abrogate" the states' eleventh amendment im-
munity: "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amend-
ment from suit in federal court for a violation of this Act." The
second statement should clearly state Congress' intent to "impliedly
waive" the states' eleventh amendment immunity: "By participating
1807, which included a provision setting aside the force of our holding in Atascadero that
Congress had failed to provide a clear statement of abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.
The words Congress chose in that Act are instructive: "A State shall not be immune under
the Eleventh Amendment ... from suit in Federal court for a violation of [portions of
the Act]." Pub. L. 99-506, supra, 100 Stat. 1845 .... I would not go so far as to hold
that Congress must use these precise words (i.e., make reference to the Eleventh Amendment)
before it will be deemed to have abrogated States' immunity.
Id. at 2294-95 n.7.
124. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234' (1985).
125. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
[Vol. 92
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in any activity regulated under this Act, a State shall waive its elev-
enth amendment immunity from suit in federal court for a violation
of this Act." It might also be useful to add a statement saying that
"All remedies available under this Act, including damages, are avail-
able in a suit in federal court against a State."
It is vitally important for Congress to realize that the Supreme
Court has apparently thrown out the normal rules for determining
legislative intent and has mandated that courts cannot look to leg-
islative history 2 6 or policy considerations 2 7 when deciding whether
Congress has abrogated state eleventh amendment immunity under
a particular statute. Thus Congress must take great care in expressing
its intent in the text of a statute.
2 8
IV. ANALYsis OF POssIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Allowing Copyright and Patent Infringement Suits in State
Courts
Exclusive federal jurisdiction, which prevents state courts from
adjudicating copyright and patent infringement suits, has several key
126. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
127.
[T]he entire purpose of our "clear statement" rule would be obliterated if this Court were
to imply Eleventh Amendment abrogation from our sense of what would best serve the
general policy ends Congress was trying to achieve in a statute. Such arguments based on
the statute's general goals, whatever weight they might have under a normal exercise in
statutory construction, have no bearing on our analysis of congressional abrogation. Cf.
Dellmuth v. Muth, - U.S.-., (1989) .... I believe that our "clear statement" pre-
cedents bar us from implying such a policy choice-even if it is "latent" in the statutory
scheme, or an advisable means of achieving the statute's ends.
Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2291-92.
128. See supra note 45.
Congress is in the process of amending the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. (1976). In March,
1989, Congress proposed the "Copyright Remedy Clarification Act." S. 497, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); H.R. 1131, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This proposed bill would amend § 501(a) and §
910(a) of Title 17 of the United States Code by explicitly including States within the term "anyone"
in defining who could be liable for copyright infringement. Then in July, 1989, Congress decided
that it needed to make itself even more clear, so it renamed the bill the "State Copyright Liability
Legislation" bill and added an explicit reference to state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment:
"Any State ... shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court ... for
a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner." S. 497, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
H.R. 1131, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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advantages. First and foremost, it leads to more uniformity in de-
cisions and thus more certainty in the law. Second, because federal
courts specialize in federal law, they are more experienced and skilled
at interpreting and applying federal law. Third, federal courts are
less likely to be swayed by local concerns and prejudices.
In this context, state court jurisdiction would be disastrous. Pat-
ent law was already chaotic and confused enough when there were
only twelve U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal with appellate jurisdiction
in patent cases. At that time, it was possible for a United States
patent to be held valid in one district while it was held invalid in
another. Such uncertainty as to the validity and value of a patent
discourages investment in research and development. It also hinders
our economy from competing in today's global markets. To bring
some order and certainty to the U.S. patent laws, Congress created
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal District in 1982 and gave
it exclusive appellate jurisdiction (aside from the Supreme Court) in
patent cases. Now a patent that is held valid in one state will be
valid in all states.
It is hard to imagine going back to the confusion of twelve sep-
arate federal appellate courts hearing patent cases, but it is even
harder to imagine allowing fifty different states to interpret the fed-
eral patent laws. A cacophony of twelve different voices was con-
fusing enough. Also, the technical nature of most patent cases require
a familiarity with science or engineering just to understand the issues
involved. It would seem that Congress has found the best solution
by investing sole appellate jurisdiction (again, subject to the over-
sight of the Supreme Court) in patent cases to a single federal court
of appeals with expertise in the patent area.
In the copyright context, exclusive federal jurisdiction affords
some of the same advantages. Uniformity in the application of a
statute prevents conflicting outcomes. It also reduces litigants' in-
centive to "shop around" for the most favorable jurisdiction. 2 9 In-
creased certainty in the nationwide protection of copyrighted works
129. If states were able to adjudicate copyright infringement claims, forum shopping would
greatly increase because of the disagreements and variances that would undoubtedly develop between
the fifty states as to their interpretations of the federal copyright laws.
[Vol. 92
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increases the value of such works and thereby encourages new works
to be created.
Federal court expertise is also important in the copyright context.
Copyright issues are becoming more important and more complex
as existing copyright doctrine is applied to new technology in areas
such as computer software and mask works. 130 Copyright law thus
requires an understanding of the nuances of the development of
copyright law in these areas, as well as an understanding of the
needs created by these new technologies. Copyright law itself must
be adapted and developed to fit these new technology areas. Ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction ensures that the judge will be familiar
with both existing copyright law and with the developments taking
place in federal copyright law. Amending the federal copyright and
patent statutes to do away with exclusive federal court jurisdiction,
and allowing infringement suits in state court, would be a poor
solution.131
B. Abrogating State Immunity From Copyright and Patent Suits
in Federal Courts
The policy reasons underlying the eleventh amendment are not
served by allowing states immunity in copyright and patent in-
fringement cases. There is no great risk to the state coffers-to avoid
paying damages, all the states have to do is obey the federal cop-
yright and patent laws. There is no struggle of power between the
state courts and federal courts-Congress has already given the fed-
eral courts exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's ruling in Un-
ion Gas Co. can and should be extended to hold that Congress has
the authority under its plenary powers in the Patent and Copyright
Clause to abrogate state immunity from copyright and patent suits
for damages in federal courts. Such an extension is supported by
the Court's rationale in Union Gas Co. and would not require the
Court to modify its present interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.
130. Protection of Semiconductor Chip Products, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. V 1983-1988).
131. Contra, Recent Development, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A
Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 VAND. L. REv. 225, 266-269 (1987).
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It is still unclear whether states, and state officials acting in their
official capacity, can be sued for damages for copyright and patent
infringement. But after Union Gas Co., it appears more likely that
states will be held liable in such situations, once Congress adds the
necessary language to the copyright and patent statutes.
In Atascadero and its progeny, the Supreme Court changed the
rules for interpreting congressional intent in cases involving state
immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment. Atascadero and
its progeny disallows normal inquiry by courts into legislative history
and policy considerations, and, apparently, require courts to view
the text of a statute as if it was created in a total vacuum. The
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal which have ruled on the issue of state
amenability to suit for copyright infringement (post-Atascadero) have
all found the state to be immune from suit because the text of the
Copyright Act of 1976 doesn't state "with unmistakable clarity"
that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity either directly or
through the states' implied waiver of their eleventh amendment im-
munity. But Congress is in the process of amending the Copyright
Act of 1976 in order to remedy what they consider to be a mis-
interpretation on the part of the courts. Congress' unmistakably
clear intention is to revise the Copyright Act in order to meet the
Atascadero requirement of "unmistakable clarity."
Congress' revision of the Copyright Act may be of no avail if
the Supreme Court decides that Congress doesn't have the power
to abrogate state immunity when legislating pursuant to its powers
under the Constitution's Article I Patent and Copyright Clause. Ren-
dering a decision on a very related issue, the Supreme Court recently
held in Union Gas Co. that Congress had the power to abrogate
state immunity when legislating pursuant to the Constitution's article
I Commerce clause. Most fortunately, the court's rationale easily
extends to Congress' other article I plenary powers, including the
patent and copyright powers.
If the federal courts are unwilling to extend the Supreme Court's
holding in Union Gas Co. to Congress' plenary power under the
Patent and Copyright clause, there is still the implied waiver doctrine
[Vol. 92
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from Parden. The implied waiver doctrine allows Congress to con-
dition a state's participation in a federal program on the state's
waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity, provided that Congress
makes its intention to create such a condition unmistakably clear in
the text of the statute.
In summary, once Congress adds appropriate language to the
federal copyright and patent laws, the holding in Union Gas Co.
can and should be extended to find that states can be held liable
for damages in copyright and patent infringement suits.
Susan C. Hill
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